C. Metaphors and Categories
Exploring how categories can treat sets of different things as equivalent or similar leads us to an exploration of metaphor and simile. Metaphors literally equate different things (as in "law is a gnarly tree"), while similes emphasize likeness without the bolder assertion of equivalence (as in "law is like a gnarly tree"). 8 Despite their surface difference from metaphors, however, one can question whether similes are not also metaphorical at a deeper level. To say "X is like Y," do we not in some sense equate "X" with its referent? Is this not equating something with what it is not? Is this not therefore a form of metaphor? Perhaps we should call this something like embedded metaphor? Though I cannot resist raising these questions, I need not resolve them here since, as noted below, grasping the bolder claims of metaphor should also allow readers to grasp the weaker facial claims of similes.
D.Metaphors, Similes, and Law
Metaphors and similes guide even the most mundane legal matters. A simple contract for the sale of baseballs, for example, might specify that the balls must be "spheres." Such a specification is effectively either metaphor or simile depending upon what is meant by "sphere." Since true or perfect spheres do not exist in the real world, 9 the contract specifications would be metaphorical if "sphere" has the perfect geometrical sense never actually found in this imperfect world. 8 . See RICHARD A. LANHAM, A HANDLIST OF RHETORICAL TERMS 100 (2d ed. 1991) (emphasis omitted) (defining a metaphor as an "assertion of identity rather than, as with [s]imile, likeness."). For the difference between metaphor and metonymy (i.e., the use "of one entity to refer to another that is related to it," such as when a server refers to a customer as "the ham sandwich" because of what he ordered), see GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 35-40 (1980) In such a case, the contract would be equating baseballs (imperfect spheres) with something not found in this imperfect world (perfect spheres). However, if "sphere" instead means "something like an ideal geometric sphere," we would have a simile in form at least. 10 In either case, the applied "sphere" category would treat "sets of things" "as if they were, for the purposes at hand, similar or equivalent or somehow substitutable for each other." 11 Additionally, we must speak metaphorically when we would populate the world with legal creations. Fee simple, for example, does not exist in nature itself. Pointing to any "parcel" of land as a "fee simple tract" necessarily equates something (dirt) with something else (fee simple) that does not really exist in the world. 12 Of course, one might make the same point about non-legal concepts we create such as "dirt" and even "nature" itself. A child's notion of "dirt" undoubtedly differs from a geologist's, yet they both apply those different notions to the same thing. Similarly, an atheist's notion of "nature" undoubtedly differs from a pantheist's notion. Yet, again, both apply these very different notions to the same thing. I raise these non-legal points only to note that there are no natural categories apart from our definitional systems; categories, in other words, come from us and not from the world itself. 13 As we shall see, good lawyers recognize and remain cognizant of this fundamental truth.
II. HOW METAPHORS WORK BY EMPHASIZING AND HIDING
Since metaphor makes the bolder assertion of equivalence, rather than simile's facial assertion of mere similarity, I shall focus on metaphor rather than simile for the remainder of the 10. The question of embedded metaphors posed in Section I(C) could be posed here as well.
11. AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 20. 12. See id. at 27-28. Additionally, if we say that Blackacre is a rectangle, we use metaphor to the extent we frame Blackacre as a geometric space involving perfect lines, angles and points that can never exist in the real world. See also Rovetto, supra note 9, at 1. learned the hard way, "empty," like all other categories, can downplay highly-relevant information. Good lawyers also know that forgetting the incomplete and biased nature of metaphor can also lead them to miss opportunities provided by "the alternative categories [they] did not use." 19 This can apply at multiple levels, including both structure and strategy. For example, a lawyer representing a client seeking "to lease" Blackacre does not represent her client well if she does not consider whether other possible means of controlling the land (such as a license or a purchase) might better serve her client. To do that, she of course needs to inquire sufficiently about the client's needs and interests. If, for example, she finds that the client wishes to control the land for generations, she might better serve her client by suggesting a purchase.
Additionally, if that lawyer always sees negotiation as combat, she forgets that negotiation can be (and often ought to be) cooperative. 20 She may thus unwittingly harm her client by negotiating a worse deal than she might otherwise have done.
Remembering to look for the categories and metaphors in play is not always easy. As Amsterdam and Bruner put it, we often "experience the world as categorized and simply take this experience for granted, as given." 21 At least ninety-five percent of thought may be "below the surface of conscious awareness," 22 which means that we must constantly struggle to grasp what our metaphors highlight and conceal. 
III. HOW COGNITIVE METAPHORS ARISE AND CHANGE

A. Metaphors by Design
We can consciously construct metaphors. When we lack concepts that specifically apply to a given situation, we must either create new ones or "stretch" those that we have. We can do this by using analogy or simile (X is like Y) or by using metaphor (X is Y). 23 For example, to forge concepts that adequately fit atomic or chemical data that we wish to present to a jury, we might speak of atoms as little solar systems with electrons as planets revolving around a nucleus of protons and neutrons. In doing this, we would focus on the similarities between the two parts of the equation and ignore the dissimilarities. Of course, good lawyers ignore nothing of potential relevance and will keep in mind what such metaphors suppress and suggest. A solar-system atom, for example, might suggest that neutrons and protons are hot, like the sun, while electrons are colder, like planets. It might also suggest that electrons are solid and particulate like planets. The metaphor presumably ignores such things as moons of planets, comets, and other things within solar systems but without obvious relevance to atoms. This may ultimately work or it may not, depending on how close the correlations must be for jury purposes. We explore workability in more detail below.
B. Metaphors From Early Experience
We also carry forward metaphors based upon our early experiences. As Lakoff and Johnson point out, many of our conceptual metaphors are rooted in our early experiences with the world. 24 For example, children associate and conflate warmth and affection (their parents are warm when holding their children) and this carries forward into such metaphors as "a warm smile." 25 This also explains the apparent 23. METAPHORS WE LIVE BY, supra note 8, at 5 (emphasis omitted) ("The essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.").
24. PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH, supra note 7, at 46.
See id. (emphasis omitted).
inconsistency between such metaphors as "Conscious Is Up" and "Unknown Is Up." When we are awake (conscious) we are up; yet, things closer to the ground are easier to see than those high above. 26 Thus, we can understand the following spatial metaphors based upon our earliest experiences: 27 Metaphor: "Good Is Up" In exploring spatial metaphors, it is also interesting to note that categories themselves are often metaphorically conceived in spatial terms because we often perceive them as "containers" of things "with an interior, an exterior, and a boundary." 69 For example, as Lakoff and Johnson put it: "When we understand a bee as being in the garden, we are imposing an imaginative container structure on the garden, with the bee inside the container." 70 As they also note, such "containers" have "bounded regions, paths, centers and peripheries, objects with fronts and backs, regions above, below, and beside things." 71 Again, what we put in these containers will depend upon "the criteria chosen to measure likeness or unlikeness." 72 Because of their shared nature, these "primary" conceptual metaphors 73 " have "minimal structure," "arise[] naturally, automatically, and unconsciously through every day experience," and serve as the "atomic" building blocks of the same kinds of bodies and brains and lives in basically the same kinds of environments, so far as the features relevant to metaphor are concerned," 74 these metaphors provide a common source of discourse of which lawyers may take advantage. In the spirit of Lakoff and Johnson, I have set out in the Appendix and elsewhere the above spatial metaphors in the context of a much broader table, which also addresses other metaphors arising from the early experiences of vision, hearing, touch, taste, smell, matter, motion, and other things. 75 
C. Mutability of Metaphors
Since metaphors either come from our reactions to early experience or are later constructed by us, we can try to change them. A good lawyer understands this and does not fall into the trap of falsely believing in categorical immutability.
Even some of the most seemingly-entrenched categories can be changed, since they come from us and not from nature. 76 For example, the centuries of denying women's suffrage could seem so fixed that change would uproot nature itself. 77 Of course, nature survived such change and lawyers aware of such history can see that nature will survive remedying other longstanding wrongs as well. Understanding this changeable nature of even "entrenched" categories can thus help lawyers to understand that progress is possible even in the most "entrenched" areas.
D. Flexible Logic
In grasping the basic nature of metaphor, one must also understand its flexible logic. equate "A" and "not-A" demonstrates metaphor's power over traditional canons of logic, such as the principle of noncontradiction which holds that something cannot both be and not be in the same way at the same time. 78 Thus, despite our logic courses and despite our English teachers' admonitions that metaphors should not be mixed, there are times when metaphors should be mixed, should contradict one another. Quantum mechanics, for example, tells us that light can be explained as both a particle and a wave. 79 Of course light is not a particle (at least in the sense of the dust particles that traverse its beams) nor is it a wave (at least in the sense of waves that wash the beach under its beams). Furthermore, quantum mechanics not only tells us to equate things with what they are not, but to contradict ourselves by calling light two different things: particles and waves. Quantum mechanics does this because such a mixed metaphor can be required for good science. 80 Similarly, our early childhood experiences also teach that experience is not always consistent. As we saw in Section III(B) above, consciousness is "up" because we rise from bed into our awake state. Yet, as also seen in Section III(B) above, "up" is unknown and is beyond awareness because it is removed from our location on the ground below. "Up" is both conscious and not-conscious. And, as noted in the Appendix, time is both stationary and in motion: "Time flies," 81 yet, we have made it through another week. 82 Good lawyers and law students thus understand that:
To operate only in terms of a consistent set of metaphors is to hide many aspects of reality. Successful functioning in our daily lives seems to 78 . See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 625 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995) ("The conjunction of a proposition and its negation is a *contradiction and necessarily false.").
79 
E. Metaphors in Narrative
Finally, metaphors are frequently infixed in narrative, and rival narratives can frequently interpret the same "facts" with equal plausibility. 84 Failure to realize "that there is more than one 'true' story" 85 can lead one to be "unconsciously captive to a set of unexamined assumptions based on narratives." 86 Linda H. Edwards, for example, explores how rival narratives of "hard-won freedoms secured by the American Revolution and the founding of the Nation" 87 versus "the myth of redemptive violence" 88 and its narrative of "the world as an overwhelmingly dangerous place, under attack by powerful evil forces" 89 helped drive the case of an American citizen held as an "enemy combatant." 90 More specifically, as Professor Edwards persuasively recounts, President Bush and the Fourth Circuit saw the arrest and detention of Hamdi through the lens of a dangerous-world narrative whose "only hope is a strong leader, who will save vulnerable mortals by defeating the powers that threaten them, thus imposing order and safety." 91 This strong leader was of course the President, and "[t]o defend us, the executive 83. Id. at 221. We can also see this flexibility in the inconsistency of our basic metaphors: "rational is up," id. at 17 (emphasis omitted), yet, "unknown is up." Id. at 137 (emphasis omitted).
84. See generally AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 2, at 111 (explaining that "stories construct the facts that comprise them").
85 
IV. EVALUATING METAPHORS
A. Evaluation and Workability
Once we understand the importance of metaphors generally, how do we evaluate metaphors in specific cases? How do we know whether they are "good" or "bad," "right" or "wrong," or "true or false," especially given metaphor's flexible logic noted above? To answer these questions, we must return to the purpose of categories and other metaphors.
Again, lawyers (and all other thinkers) use categories and other metaphors to organize experiences in ways that hopefully, among other things, make such experiences more predictable and otherwise easier to handle. 95 By categorizing experiences together, lawyers do not have to reanalyze "similar" experiences, but can reuse metaphors and categories in ways they have seen already work. For example, as noted earlier, if a lawyer has decided that all of her associates are competent and are not likely to make a mistake when drawing up a deed, she can act accordingly without further analysis when she needs them to prepare a deed in the future. Of course, the lawyer's categorization of such associates (as well as the lawyer's resulting decision to use such associates accordingly) must actually work in practice if the categorization is to be a good one. One would not say that she has reasoned well if some of her "good" associates cannot in fact do good work. Thus, at a minimum, good categories must work "sufficiently well enough for [the user] to function." 96 What, however, do we mean by the term "work"?
B. Four Factors of Workability
Predictability
We can begin to uncover the sense of "workability" here by starting with logic's distinction between valid arguments (where the conclusions logically follows from the premises) and sound arguments (where the premises and conclusions are all true). 97 The following argument, for example, is valid (of good form 98 ) but is not sound (not factually true): If clocks measure time, then I will become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court tomorrow. Clocks measure time. Therefore, I will become Chief Justice of the Supreme Court tomorrow.
Of course, I will not become Chief Justice tomorrow (nor is that status tied to clocks in the way claimed). Despite its perfectly logical form, the argument above must fail because it predicts something that will not in fact happen. Because of such inaccurate prediction, this argument does not work in the real world of experience, and we can thus see how predictability plays a role in workability. For something to work, it of course must not lead to inaccurate predictions of how experience will unfold. This is a pretty obvious necessary component of workability, though (as the following sections 
Respecting Past and Precedent
Respecting past and precedent can promote economy (not wasting effort solving problems already solved), fairness (treating similar cases the same), and predictability (permitting those contemplating future action to rely on past decisions, practices, and views). 100 Such respect for the past (though not unbending deference to the past) thus plays a critical role in legal and other analysis. 101 For example, imagine that a parent starts giving his first child a weekly allowance when that child reaches the age of twelve and the parent is satisfied with that decision. If the parent has no reason to think the "at twelve" rule did not work, why would it not be a waste of effort to reconsider the rule when the second child comes round? Furthermore, how would it be fair to treat the next child differently unless the parent had good reason to do so (such as financial setbacks or the second child's behavior)? Any change could also generate confusion for the next child who, because of past example, had assumed his allowance would also begin at age twelve. Why do that without good reason? On their faces, similar economy, fairness, and predictability considerations apply lawyers, judges, litigants, and parties to transactions.
Of course, these reasons for respecting past and precedent fail when there has been error, unfairness, or other reasons that require new thought. Unbending deference to the past can generate unfair results (by perpetuating error or injustice or reaching wrong results in changed circumstances), thwart judicial or mental economy (by requiring periodic reconsideration or patches as discussed below where the 99. See HILARY PUTNAM, PRAGMATISM: AN OPEN QUESTION 9-10 (Blackwell 1995) (referring to "different types of 'expediency'").
100. See DAVID M. WALKER, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 1174 (Oxford 1980) ("The main justifications [for stare decisis] are that it enables a judge to utilize the wisdom of his predecessors, that it makes for uniformity of application of law to similar cases, and that it makes the law predictable.").
101. See WILSON HUHN, THE FIVE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 41-50 (3d ed. 2014) (discussing the importance of precedent and tradition). precedent simply does not work well in practice), and thwart predictability (by the doubt that hangs over questionable decisions or rules). When this happens, the very reasons of economy, fairness, and predictability that generally support precedent require us to reconsider specific precedent. 102
Simplicity
Practically speaking, one should prefer the simplest of otherwise-equally effective decisions or rules. 103 First, the simpler, by definition, should generally be easier to use. Second, additional complexity can increase the possibility of error. 104 Adding more moving parts to a machine, for example, adds more ways for the machine to break. Where a machine with one solid part works just as well as a machine with three solid parts, why would one choose the more complex device which is likely more difficult to maintain and offers three parts, rather than one-part subject to breakage?
Analysis of workability must therefore always involve simplicity analysis.
Unfortunately, what is "simpler" is not always as clear as in the above example. We can see this, for example, in cases where we can either replace something or "patch" or "rig" it. When our widget maker breaks, for example, should we patch the break or replace the entire machine? A machine with a patch has an additional part lacking in an unpatched machine and is thus more complex in that sense. However, the patch may have nominal cost and extend the life of the machine to the length of a replacement. Measuring simplicity here in terms of the number of patches would be inadequate. We should also consider the additional cost and effort required for a new machine (including new training), which are complexities actually avoided by the patch. However, what if that "simple" patch is required every day? At what point does it become simpler just to replace the machine? The scientific 102. Adhering to precedent can also promote simplicity and coherence in the senses discussed below, and any reconsideration of precedent should also involve these considerations.
103. See generally RONDO KEELE, OCKHAM EXPLAINED: FROM RAZOR TO REBELLION (2010) .
104. Id.
revolutions from Aristotle to Copernicus to Newton to Einstein give us non-legal examples of how long it has seemed sensible to patch and rig failing models. 105 In matters of law, we also have similar struggles over whether and how long to patch or rig. For example, if prohibiting same-sex marriage is a violation of equal protection, is it sufficient to patch or rig the problem by recognizing "equivalent" civil unions and continuing to prohibit same-sex unions? From a simplicity standpoint, this is not a difficult question. Here we either open up a working vehicle to others or require them to ride in a "separate but equal" new vehicle which we must now acquire and maintain. To ask which approach is simpler really answers itself. The mere fact of adding and maintaining a new vehicle alongside another already working one is on its face more complex. The onevehicle solution on these facts is simpler, and the Supreme Court has sensibly ended the patching and rigging here. 106 
Coherence in the Broadest Sense
To manage experience, concepts must furthermore work with every relevant aspect of experience. In other words, they must fit with every relevant part of experience. William James succinctly describes such coherence as "what fits every part of life best and combines with the collectivity of experience's demands, nothing being omitted." 107 Taking experience in its broadest sense, experience will include, without limitation, objective experience (such as my current body temperature), subjective experience (such as my current private thoughts and speculations about my current body temperature), and personal and community values and standards.
Something may work in one form of such experience and yet fail in another. When that happens, overall coherence fails. Similarly, in matters of law, a metaphor or concept may fail to cohere with the whole of experience. A state, for example, might need land for a roadway and might conceive that simply seizing the land without compensation would be the simplest and thus best solution. It would involve only one step, while taking and paying would involve two steps. However, that "simplest" solution would not work because it would not fit with the limitations on the powers of states to take private property without just compensation. 108 Additionally, it would not fit with moral experience: it is generally not right to take property without paying for it. Though I have criticized natural law theory and found it generally wanting, 109 natural law does bring insight in this regard.
When considering legal categories and other metaphors, moral experience is part of the total of experience we should consider.
VII. CONCLUSION
Though perhaps better known for their stylistic use of metaphor, lawyers' substantive use of metaphor drives the law. Like other disciplines, law requires its categories and thus its metaphors.
For utility's sake, lawyers put similar things in categories and thereby treat them as categorically the same. However, good lawyers understand that such categorical equating is not literally true, since nothing truly is what it is not. Instead, good lawyers understand the metaphorical nature of categorization.
Good lawyers also understand the need to identify both the conscious and unconscious metaphors in play in a given situation. They understand the need to avoid uncritically accepting others' metaphors, categories, and narratives, the need, where possible, to construct metaphors, categories, and narratives that benefit one's case, and the need to be aware of what operative metaphors, categories, and narratives highlight and conceal so that one can proceed accordingly and avoid surprise.
Good lawyers further understand that predictability, precedent, simplicity, and coherence in the broadest sense also help them evaluate their own categories and other metaphors and the "flexible" logic of metaphor discussed above. These tests also help good lawyers evaluate the categories and metaphors of others.
Finally, good lawyers understand that metaphor is more than powerful kennings or stylistic flourish. Metaphor is more than blood as "raven-wine," more than raven as "battle-gull." 110 Metaphor lives in and generates much blood, flesh, and bone of that living thing we call the law.
110. THE SAGA OF HALLFRED TROUBLESOME POET, SAGAS OF WARRIOR POETS 92 (Rory McTurk, trans., Penguin Books 1997) .
